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6.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on Russia’s unlikely experiment in National Cultural Autonomy 
(NCA). I start with Russia’s accession to the Council of Europe (CoE) and the start of its 
experiment in NCA, both of which took place in 1996. I turn next to history: to the wide 
variety of forms of autonomy in the Russian Empire, which like other territorial empires, 
was rarely assimilationist as it expanded. I give an overview of a number of cases: 
Finland, the Baltics, Russian Germans, Ukraine, Georgia, Poland, Khiva and Bukhara, 
Tatars and Inorodtsy. Second, I turn to religious diversity in Russia, after Catherine II’s 
reforms. Third, I look at the extensive scholarly literature on the constitutional role of 
autonomy in the latter years of the Russian Empire. Fourth, I examine Bolshevik 
nationalities policy before and after the 1917 Revolution, and the creation of the 
territorial autonomies in 1920–2. Fifth, I have a number of criticisms of Terry Martin’s 
excellent The Affirmative Action Empire. Sixth, I return to the new Strategy, and to an 
apparent retreat from the NCA model. My conclusion emphasizes the deep roots of 
autonomy in Russia, and expresses concern for the future of non-territorial autonomy in 
Russia. 
This chapter seeks in particular to address the paradox identified by Aleksandr 
Osipov—why does the concept of NCA sound attractive to ethnic activists?1 My aim is to 
show that autonomy has rather deeper roots in Russia than might at first be supposed.
2
 
The Russian Federation has recently grown. Since the illegal annexation of 
Crimea
3
 in March 2014 there are now, according to the Russian government website,
4
 
eighty-five subjects of the Federation, the Republic of Crimea,
5
 and its capital, the City of 
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 Alexander Osipov, Natsional’no-kul’turnaia avtonomiia: idei, resheniia, instituty 
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Sevastopol, which now have the status of a City of Federal Significance.
6
 There are 
twenty-one ethnic republics, with the right to an official language in addition to Russian.
7
 
Russia’s ethnic and linguistic diversity is impressive if not unique. Russia’s first 
Report, of 8 March 2000, to the Advisory Committee under the CoE’s Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), stated that ‘The Russian 
Federation is one of the largest multinational states in the world, inhabited by more than 
170 peoples, the total population being about 140 million.’8 Russia also reported that 
‘The education in Russia’s schools is now available in thirty-eight languages. . . . As 
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many as seventy-five national languages are a part (including languages of national 
minorities) of the secondary schools curricula.’9 The annexation of Crimea means that 
there is one more ‘people’, the Crimean Tatars. On 1 October 2014 the CoE’s 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Nils Muiznieks, told the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the CoE that his ‘biggest concern’ in Ukraine was the plight of Crimean Tatars who have 
remained in Crimea since it was annexed by Russia in March.
10
 
6.1.1 How Does the Russian Federation Seek to Organize and Manage 
such Complexity? 
Russia joined the CoE in 1996, signed the FCNM on 28 February 1996, ratified it on 21 
August 1998 and it entered into force on 1 December 1998. The Report highlighted the 
experiment in non-territorial, personal autonomy initiated by the Federal Law ‘On 
National-Cultural Autonomy’11  of 17 June 1996.12 
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elsewhere; Bill Bowring, ‘Austro-Marxism’s Last Laugh?: The Struggle for Recognition 
of National-Cultural Autonomy for Rossians and Russians’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 54, 
no. 2 (2002): pp. 229–50; Bill Bowring, ‘Burial and Resurrection: Karl Renner’s 
My own estimation in 2002 was that this adoption of the NCA form was a 
dramatic reversal of the Soviet hostility to non-territorial autonomy, dating back to the 
series of substantial polemics against this Austro-Marxist proposal, written by Lenin, 
Stalin, and Trotsky, to name but three.
13
 At the same time it represented a significant 
victory on the part of Professor Valeriy Tishkov and his co-thinkers, including the 
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Autonomy and its Contemporary Critics, edited by Ephraim Nimni (Abingdon[given as 
London in Biblio]: Routledge, 2005), pp. 191–206; Bill Bowring, ‘The Tatars of the 
Russian Federation and National-Cultural Autonomy: A Contradiction in Terms?’, 
Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics, vol. 6, no. 3 (2007): pp. 417–35. 
[not in Biblio]Since Russia’s first Report in 2000, I have published two journal articles 
and a book chapter on the question of the Russian experiment in non-territorial 
autonomy. My particular focus has been the history of the hotly contested struggle in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries between the Austro-Marxist conception of 
non-territorial personal cultural autonomy, taken up with enthusiasm by the Jewish Bund 
and by Muslim activists; and the Social-Democratic and Bolshevik orthodoxy of 
territorial autonomy under Lenin’s banner of the Right of Nations to Self-Determination. 
See the text with that title, written in February–May 1914, and published in April–June 
1914 in the journal Prosveshcheniye Nos. 4, 5 and 6. Signed: V. Ilyin. V. I. Lenin, 
Collected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), Volume 20, pp. 393–454, and 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/. [not in Biblio]I have traced 
this contest through to the present day, with particular reference to the Tatars. 
13
 Bowring, ‘Austro-Marxism’s Last Laugh’, pp. 229–50. 
politician Gavriil Popov, in their contemporaneous campaign against the very concept 
‘nation’.14 For Tishkov and others, NCA was a viable alternative to the Soviet legacy of 
territorial autonomy and essentialized concepts of ethnicity and nationhood. 
In 2004, Osipov provided the most cogent and searching critique to date of the 
NCA experiment since 1996 in Russia.
15
 There is a paradox. Notwithstanding the evident 
weaknesses of the NCA form, it is surprisingly popular. In 2010 Osipov noted that: 
The concept of ‘autonomy’ still sounds attractive to ethnic activists. 
Despite legislative restrictions and bureaucratic burdens, the number of 
NCAs has grown over the years. By early 1999, 227 NCAs had been 
registered, of which 160 were local, 60 regional, and 7 federal. The 
respective figures for the beginning of 2005 were: 315, 173, and 16 (in 
total, 504). On 1 January 2009, there were 717 organizations, of which: 
488 were local, 211 regional, and 18 federal. 
NCAs represent more than 60 ethnicities—in particular, federal NCAs 
have been established on behalf of Armenians, Assyrians, Azeris, 
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 Valery Tishkov, ‘O natsii i natsionalisme’ [On the Nation and Nationalism], 
Svobodnaya Mysl, no. 3 (1996); Valery Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in 
and after the Soviet Union. The Mind Aflame (London: Sage, 1997); Valery Tishkov, 
‘Zabyt o natsii. Post-natsionalisticheskoye ponimaniye natsionalism’ [Forget about the 
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 See, for example, Osipov, Natsional’no-kul’turnaia avtonomiia; Osipov, ‘National 
Cultural Autonomy in Russia’, pp. 27–57. 
Belarusians, Chuvash, Germans, Jews, Karachais, Kazakhs, Koreans, 
Kurds, Lezghins, Lithuanians, Poles, Roma, Serbs, Tatars, and Ukrainians. 
Regional and local NCAs have been set up in 72 of 83 constituent units 
(subjects) of the Russian Federation. Several NCAs represent ethnic 
groups officially acknowledged as small indigenous peoples of Russia.
16
 




6.2 Autonomy in Tsarist Russia 
The roots of Russian conceptions of autonomy extend back into the sixteenth century. In 
an authoritative overview, Robert Suny pointed out that 
With Ivan IV’s conquests of Kazan and Astrakhan in the mid-sixteenth 
century, the Muscovite state incorporated ethnically compact non-Russian 
territories, indeed an alien polity, and transformed a relatively 
homogenized Russia into a multinational empire . . . when the problem of 
security was settled, Moscow allowed local elites, though no longer 
sovereign, to rule and traditional customs and laws to continue in force. As 
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 Osipov, ‘National Cultural Autonomy in Russia’, pp. 42–3. 
17
 In what follows I have revisited the research which I carried out for my chapter: Bill 
Bowring, ‘Minorities Protection in Russia: Is There a ‘Communist Legacy’?’, in 
Institutional Legacies of Communism: Change and Continuities in Minority Protection, 
edited by Karl Cordell, Timofey Agarin, and Alexander Osipov (Abingdon: Routledge 
2013), pp. 45–58, and Bill Bowring, Law, Rights and Ideology in Russia: Landmarks in 
the Destiny of a Great Power (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), pp. 120–39.[45–58 in Biblio] 
these frontier regions became integrated in some ways into the empire as 
borderlands, many of them remained distinct administratively, though 
always subordinate to the center.
18
 
Kutafin also made the point that as it expanded the Russian Empire often preserved in the 
territories it incorporated their local laws and institutions, and accorded them more or less 
broad autonomy.
19
 He reminded his readers that the legal status of Russian regions 
changed continually over time.
20
 
In the next sections I explore the wide variety of experiences of autonomy in the 
Russian Empire. 
The most famous example of autonomy in the Russian Empire was Finland, about 
which Russian scholars have conflicting views. Some consider Finland to have been an 
independent state in de facto union with Russia. Others see it as a province with a high 
degree of autonomy. A third camp sees Finland as a non-sovereign state united with 
Russia on the basis of subordination. N. M. Korkunov considered these distinctions to 
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 Ronald Grigor Suny, ‘The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, “National” Identity, 
and Theories of Empire’, in A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Soviet 
Union, 1917–1953[full ref for book?], first delivered as a paper for the University of 
Chicago Conference, Empire and Nations: The Soviet Union and the Non-Russian 
Peoples, 24–6 October 1997, pp. 21–2, accessed 1 June 2014, 
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 Kutafin, Rossiyskaya avtonomiya, p. 42. 
have enormous practical significance.
21
 Thus, the Grand Duchy of Finland was 
considered to be a special independent state united with Russia only through the 
Romanov dynasty. 
Finland was incorporated into the Empire in three stages. With the Treaty of 
Nystad, on 30 August 1721, at the end of the Great Northern War against Sweden, 
Estonia, Livonia, Ingria, and Southeast Finland (Kexholmslän and part of Karelia) were 
transferred to Russia. The Peace Treaty of 1743 transferred more territory; and on 5 
September 1809 by the Treaty of Fredrikshamn, the remainder of Finland was annexed to 
Russia. During 1808–9 Aleksandr I gradually recognized Finnish autonomy, and on 16 
March 1809 the Emperor opened the four-chamber Seim, or legislature, which had been 
elected according to Swedish electoral law. 
The linguistic situation which resulted is of great interest.
22
 On 25 October 1858 
the Finnish language was allowed to be used in legal disputes and dissertations; on 1 
August 1863 the Finnish language received equal status with Swedish for all purposes; 
and on 9 February 1863 the Russian language ceased to be a compulsory subject in 
primary schools. On 20 February 1865 the Finnish language became the working 
language in judicial and administrative institutions along with Swedish, and on 30 
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 Nikolai Mikhailovich Korkunov (1853–1904), leading scholar at St Petersburg 
University; Nikolai Mikhailovich Korkunov, Russkiye gosudarstvennoye pravo [Russian 
State Law] (St Petersburg: Publisher?, 1892), p. 134; Kutafin, Rossiyskaya avtonomiya, 
p. 46. 
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 Kutafin, Rossiyskaya avtonomiya, p. 55. 
November 1871 the Finnish Senate was given the right to determine the language of 
secondary education. 
Thus from 1863 it could be said that Finland was part of the Russian Empire, but 
with its own laws and judicial and administrative institutions. On 3 September 1863 
Aleksandr II opened the Seim with the words that he preserved the basis of a 
constitutional monarchy reflecting the spirit of the Finnish people. From that date the 
Seim was elected every five years. 
Other territories and subjects of the Empire, although not autonomous in the sense 
that Finland enjoyed, nevertheless had administrative or legal arrangements, which could 
give the impression that they were on the way to some kind of autonomous status. 
The closest example to the experience of Finland is that of the Baltic territories. 
These were incorporated into Russia in the eighteenth century. Ingeborg Fleischhauerhas 
related that the Peace of Nystadt in 1721 reconfirmed the Baltic Germans’ freedom of 
religion and cultus, which they had enjoyed under Swedish rule, that is, Protestantism 
including a Protestant University at Dorpat, German administration in town and country, 
and German law.
23
 The Baltic territories were divided into the Estlyandskiy, 
Liflyandskiy, and Kurlyandskiy governorates, as part of one general-governorate with 
Ostzeiskiy Krai. The inhabitants of these krais maintained their own religious 
observance, as well as their own laws—the German, Swedish, Polish laws in operation 
before Russian rule. 
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 Ingeborg Fleischhauer, ‘The Nationalities Policy of the Tsars Reconsidered—The Case 
of the Russian Germans’, The Journal of Modern History, vol. 53, no. 1 (1981): pp. 
D1065–90. 
With the great judicial reforms of Aleksandr II in 1864, the Baltics obtained their 
own judicial organs. They had their own system of local government. The Baltic nobility 
provided the Empire with soldiers, diplomats, senior civil servants, and members of the 
court. 
The Russian Germans were not mentioned at all by Kutafin in his book on 
Russian autonomy. However, Fleischhauer has pointed out that the Russian Empire’s 
attitude to non-Russians was ‘based on pragmatic and not on racial grounds.’24 National 
groups considered useful for imperial purposes were to be attracted and favoured by the 
state. The Russian Germans comprised three groups: the Baltic Germans, often called 
ostseizskiye nemtsy; the urban population; and the colonists. 
According to the 1897 census the three groups together numbered about two 
million, with 1.3 million colonists; half a million urban dwellers: 375,000 in industry, 
100,000 in trade and commerce, 50,000 in academic professions, and 35,000 in the civil 
service and army, as well as more than 50,000 belonging to the hereditary or personal 
nobility, or honorary citizens.
25
 By the outbreak of World War I the German population 
was much larger and very wealthy. 
According to Fleischhauer, this success was in part the result of the Germans’ 
legally privileged situation. I have already mentioned the privileges of the Baltic 
Germans. The urban Germans in the Empire enjoyed ten years’ exemption from taxes 
outside the cities and five years’ within them; free movement in Russia and the right to 
leave when they wished; large state loans for new factories; tax-free imports and exports 
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 Fleischhauer, ‘The Nationalities Policy of the Tsars Reconsidered’, p. D1066. 
25
 Fleischhauer, ‘The Nationalities Policy of the Tsars Reconsidered’, pp. D1072–3. 
in the first years; use of local Russian labour including serfs; and membership of the 
Russian guilds with all their privileges.
26
 
German peasants settling in Russia had the following privileges. According to the 
‘call’ of 1763, every male farmer was given 30 to 60 desyatiny of arable land, granted by 
the Crown as community property belonging to the colony in which the farmer settled; 
thirty years’ exemption from taxes; exemption from all forms of military service for ever; 
freedom of movement; the right to acquire goods, chattels, and land in the whole Empire; 
freedom to leave and to export all legally acquired property; free transition to another 
social estate, state loans; etc.
27
 
The oldest German colonies were those on the Volga, with about 30,000 settlers 
after the first two decades of settlement. Colonies were established in other parts of 
Russia. And at the beginning of the twentieth century colonies were established in 
Siberia. There were some 300 colonies in all. 
Ukraine, by contrast, lost all of its initial autonomy by degrees. Thus, the 
Pereyaslavska Rada (Pereyaslavskaya Council) of 8 January 1654 decided upon the 
union of the Ukrainian-Cossack formation of Bogdan Khmelnitskiy and Russia (in 1954 
Khrushchev celebrated its anniversary by transferring Crimea from the Russian SFSR to 
the Ukrainian SSR).
28
 Also known as the Martovskiy Stati, this created the autonomous 
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 Fleischhauer, ‘The Nationalities Policy of the Tsars Reconsidered’, p. D1078. 
27
 Fleischhauer, ‘The Nationalities Policy of the Tsars Reconsidered’, pp. D1082–3. 
28
 N. N. Soleinik, ‘Pereyaslavskaya Rada 1654 goda: Sovremennoye politico-pravovoye 
issledovaniye’ [The Pereyaslavakaya Rada of 1654: Contemporary Political and Legal 
status of Ukraine within Russia, together with the rights and privileges of the Cossack 
elders, and Ukrainian institutions and clerics. The territory of Ukraine was divided into 
three parts: Left Bank Ukraine, divided into polka; Slobodskiy Ukraine, also divided into 
five polka; and the Zaporozhskiy Sech, the most autonomous part of Ukraine. Polki and 
‘hundreds’ (sotni) were the territorial administrative units of Ukraine. Power was 
concentrated in the hands of the hetman, who commanded military forces and made and 
administered the laws. Control over the activities of the Ukrainian authorities was 
instituted in 1663 by the Malorossiiskaya Prikaz, replaced in 1722 by the 
Malorossiiskaya Kollegiya. 
In 1734 the power of the hetman was abolished, and the Cossack forces came 
under Russian command. However, in 1747 the hetman institution was revived, with 
control over the Zaporozhskiy Sech. 
In 1764 the hetman was again abolished, and the Malorossiiskaya Kollegiya was 
once more put in charge of Ukraine, with a presidency of four Russians and four 
Ukrainians. However, Ukrainians were not able to participate, and the General 
Governorate of Malaya Rossiya was created. The laws effective in Ukraine were the 
second and third Lithuanian Statutes, and Magdeburg (town) law. In 1728 a commission 
was established for the codification of Ukrainian law, which in 1743 completed 
preparation of the Svod ‘Law by which the Malaya Rossiiskaya people are to be judged.’ 
It had three books: Lithuanian Statute, Saxon Zertsala, and the book ‘Order’. Courts were 
established in 1763 on the basis of the Lithuanian Statutes. In 1796 Left Bank Ukraine 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Research], Vedomosti of Belgorod State University, vol. 28, no. 22 (165) (2013): pp. 
207–10. 
became the Malorossiiskaya Guberniya (governorate); and Slobodskaya Ukraine became 
the Slobodsko-Ukrainsko Guberbniya. Right Bank Ukraine was divided into the Kiev, 
Volynsk, and Podolsk governorates, in 1832 re-named the Kiev General Governorate. 
In this way Ukraine lost all of its autonomy, and re-emerged as an independent 
state only after World War I, as a Soviet Union republic after World War II, and as an 
independent state after 1991. 
Georgia has a very long history of independence, and was for long, in opposition 
to the Ottoman Empire, seen as a state under Russia’s protection. Closer ties were 
instituted by the Treaty of 1783, according to which Tsar Irakliy of the Kingdom of 
Kartli-Kakheti
29
 recognized no authority higher than himself save the Russian Empress, 
who for her part undertook to protect him from external foes.
30
 The final unification of 
Russia and Georgia took place in 1801 at the request in 1800 of Tsar Georgiy to Paul I. 
On 12 January 1801 Aleksandr I explained to the Georgian people in a Manifesto that 
although he desired to preserve the independence of Georgia, he was obliged by force of 
circumstances to preserve the Tsardom of Georgia for Russia. The Ulozheniye of Tsar 
Vakhtang was preserved as the law of Georgia. 
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 Created in 1762 by the unification of two eastern Georgian kingdoms, which had 
existed independently since the disintegration of the united Georgian Kingdom in the 
fifteenth century. 
30
 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation (Place?: Indiana University 
Press, 1994), pp. 57–9. 
Much blood was shed subsequently for Georgia’s independence: as Moshe Lewin 
has shown, Lenin’s last struggle was against Stalin, on the question of independence for 
Georgia, which Lenin supported despite the fact that Mensheviks would be in power.
31
 
Even more tragically than Ukraine and Georgia, Poland continuously lost its 
autonomy, largely through the actions of the Russian Empire, and in the end disappeared 
completely. 
As a result of the three Partitions of the eighteenth century and the decision of the 
Congress of Vienna in 1814, Russia gained part of the territory of Poland, on which the 
Polish Tsardom (kingdom) was organized. In 1815 Poland within the Empire received a 
constitutional charter and the status of a kingdom. The Russian emperor became also the 
king of Poland. Its legislature was the Seim, with elections in 1820 and 1825. The Seim 
contained a senate, composed of the Polish nobility, and the Posolskiy Izby, elected in the 
localities. The Seim had full legislative competence, including fiscal. The official state 
language was Polish. 
However, after the Polish uprising of 1830, the Organic Status was published, 
amending the Polish constitution, and making Poland an inseparable part of the Empire. 
The customs border between Russia and Poland was abolished in 1850.
32
 
After the further uprisings of 1863–4 the last traces of autonomy were 
extinguished. Nevertheless, even after the end of autonomy the Code Civil of Napoleon I 
and other French legislation were preserved, with obligatory force in the Duchy of Poland 
from 1 May 1808, and extended in 1810 to the governorates taken from Austria. 
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 Moshe Lewin, Lenin’s Last Struggle (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005). 
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 Kutafin, Rossiyskaya avtonomiya, pp. 44–5. 
As Kutafin points out, not all the states incorporated into Russia lost their 
autonomy. For example, Khiva, now in Uzbekistan, was to a large extent independent 
even though de facto fully subordinated to Russia.
33
 According to the Treaty of 12 
August 1873 Said-Mukhamed Rakhim-Bogodur Khan maintained executive power. 
Bukhara, also now in Uzbekistan, had even higher autonomy. Its status was defined in a 
Treaty of 28 September 1873. The emir of Bukhara exercised power from Tashkent, and 
from 1893 Russia maintained an ambassador. Of course, neither Khiva nor Bukhara were 
formally part of the Russian Empire. They were considered to be states under Russia’s 
protection. 
Kutafin says little about the Tatars, who have been the focus of some of my own 
work.
34
 In contemporary Russia the Tatars not only have their own republic of Tatarstan, 
the most autonomous and one of the wealthiest regions in the Russian Federation, but are 
the largest ethnic and linguistic minority with some 5.5 million members. 
Tsar Ivan IV (the Terrible) conquered Kazan in 1552, and incorporated the 
khanate of Kazan into the Grand Duchy of Moscow’s territory. Ivan followed his victory 
with a policy of Christianization and Russification of his Tatar subjects and other 
indigenous peoples, which was not reversed until the reign of Catherine the Great. But 
the Tatar language and Muslim religion were not eliminated. Schamiloglu in 1990 
provided elements of a more complete picture.
35
 His article concerned Sihabäddin 
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 Kutafin, Rossiyskaya avtonomiya, p. 45. 
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35
 Uli Schamiloglu was born in New York of Kazan Tatar ancestry, and is now professor 
at Wisconsin-Madison See his home page http://www.turko-tatar.com/uli/, and 
Märcani (1818–89), the father of modern Kazan Tatar historiography, who wrote in the 
nineteenth century, during the Tatar revival within the Russian Empire. Schamiloglu 
examined the process by which the ‘modern identity of the Kazan Tatars was created’. 
If, then, the creation of Tatar national identity was crystallized in the nineteenth 
century, that is proof positive that the tsarist Empire had not destroyed Tatar 
consciousness: on the contrary. Thus, Märcani was one of the leading Kazan Tatar 
intellectuals of the nineteenth century: following early education in a village madrassa in 
Taşkiçü, he received an Islamic education in Bukhara and Samarkand, and returned to 
positions in a mosque and madrassa, and was appointed teacher at the Russo-Tatar 
Teacher’s School.36 
Schamiloglu observed that the name ‘Tatar’ was ‘originally not the self-
appellation of the Muslim Turks of the Middle Volga region’. Before the Mongol 
conquests they were known as ‘Bulğars.’ The name ‘Tatar’ was introduced during the 
Mongol period, and gained broad acceptance by the Kazan Tatars only in the nineteenth 
century. Märcani wanted, for nationalist reasons, to emphasize that under the ‘Tatar 
Yoke’ (1223–1480) ‘the Russian dukes could not act without the permission of the Tatar 
Khans’, and emphasized the Russians’ role as tax collectors.37 It is no surprise that many 
Russian words—for money, treasury, horse, etc.—are of Turkic origin. 
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Central Asian Survey, vol. 9, no. 2 (1990): pp. 39–49. 
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But Schamiloglu points out that there is a dearth of historical sources for the 
period of the khanate of Kazan from the 1430s to 1552, when Kazan was conquered by 
Ivan IV, not least because of Russian destruction of libraries and archives. He reminds us 
that 
Following the fall of the Khanate in 1552 as the first foreign conquest of 
the emerging Russian Empire, elements of the dynastic and tribal elite of 
the Khanate of Kazan either fled to other states, were incorporated into the 
developing Russian aristocracy, or were simply vanquished. The 
indigenous Muslim Turkic population in or around the city of Kazan was 
resettled beyond a perimeter extending many kilometres away from the 
city. The indigenous and newly-resettled population of the surrounding 
territories (again including the former core territories of the Volga 
Bulğarian state) would later form the core group of the modern Kazak 
Tatars. In the 19th century these Muslim Turks of the Middle Volga 
region began to acquire a shared identity under the name ‘Kazan Tatar’.38 
Märcani’s work was not only an astonishing achievement in adverse circumstances, but 
more importantly a classic nineteenth-century ‘creation of an ideology of national 
identity’, as described by Eric Hobsbawm.39 It was also an essential ingredient for the 
creation of the Tatar ASSR in 1920–1. 
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The situation of the so-called inorodtsy, the non-Slavic populations of the Empire, 
was defined in Russian legislation.
40
 These included the samoyedy of Arkhangelsk 
guberniya, the ‘kocheviye inorodtsy’ of Stavropol guberniya, the Kalmyks of Astrakhan 
and Stavropol, the Kyrgyz of the Inner Horde, the inorodtsy of the Akmola and 
Semipalatinsk regions of present-day Kazakhstan, and the Urals and Turgan regions, the 
inorodtsy of the Zakaspian regions, and Jews.
41
 Inorodtsy enjoyed local government 
differing from the norm according to need. Inorodtsy in different localities used the 
Kitaiskoye Ulozheniye of 1725, the Mongolskoye Ulozheniye of 1798, and the Ulozheniye 
of the Mongol and Kalmyk peoples of 1690. 
The Bashkirs were semi-nomadic tribes inhabiting the territory, forest and steppe, 
beyond the Volga. Robert Baumann has pointed out that ‘despite its relative proximity to 
Moscow Bashkiria remain unassimilated by the late nineteenth century . . . an apt 
indication of Russia’s inability to impose civil administration on the vast realms to which 
it had laid claim’.42 Ivan IV penetrated the Bashkir lands following his conquest of Kazan 
and Astrakhan in the 1550s, and a fort was established at Ufa in 1586. There were 
Bashkir uprisings in 1662–4, in 1676, from 1681 to 1683, and from 1705 to 1711. 
Following the creation of the fortified town of Orenburg on the Ural River in 1735, 
Empress Anna’s agent Ivan Kirillov mercilessly crushed the consequent uprising. Finally, 
after the influx of many Russians, bringing the population of Orenburg to 884,787, and 
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the defeat of the Pugachev rebellion (1773–5), the Empire established a military 
administration for the Bashkirs similar to that of the Cossacks, named the Bashkirskoye 
voisko or Bashkir Host, with 11 cantons, each with a nachalnik. Bashkir light cavalry 
fought splendidly in the war against Napoleon.
43
 
In this way, paradoxically, the Bashkirs maintained their identity into the Soviet 
period, and the creation of present-day Bashkortostan.
44
 
Suny also observed that ‘some elites like the Tatar and Ukrainian nobles, 
dissolved into the Russian dvoryanstvo, but others, like the German barons of the Baltic 
or the Swedish aristocrats of Finland, retained privileges and separate identities’.45 
6.3 Religious Autonomy in Tsarist Russia 
In the period immediately after World War I, Muslims enthusiastically adopted ‘national-
cultural autonomy’ as a means of asserting a separate identity in post-Imperial Russia. 
Crews points out that, as he was informed by a Tatar interlocutor, Islam arrived in Russia 
before Orthodox Christianity, so that Islam is the most ‘traditional’ of Russian religions.46 
By the tenth century there were substantial Muslim communities along the Volga River, 
in Siberia, in the Caucasus, and the oasis towns of Central Asia.
47
 By the reign of 
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Catherine II Russia had ruled the Muslim peoples settled along the Volga River for more 
than two centuries, while she incorporated the Muslims of Crimea and the regions north 
of the Caucasus and Caspian Sea. By the late nineteenth century Muslims resided in 
eighty-nine provinces and territories of the Empire, together with the protectorates of 
Khiva and Bukhara. The first Imperial census held in 1897 registered 14 million 
Muslims, although the true number was probably 20 million. Three and a half million 
lived in European Russia; twelve million spoke languages of the ‘Turkic-Tatar’ group.48 
While Peter the Great had oppressed the Muslim, especially Tatar, nobility, 
Catherine the Great, inspired by Enlightenment rationality, ordered in 1787 the printing 
of the Qur’an for distribution free of charge to Kazakhs on the frontier, and in September 
1788 ordered the establishment in Ufa of an ‘Ecclesiastical Assembly of the 
Muhammedan Creed’ (Dukhovnoye sobraniye Magometanskovo zakona).49 
Mukhamedzhan Khusainov was given the title mufti, with a salary, and was to be aided 
by ‘two or three Mullahs chosen from the Kazan Tatars’. By 1800 the mufti and three 
judges attached to the Assembly administered oral examinations for more than 1,900 
clerics.
50
 The first mosque was built in Moscow in 1823, despite protests from the 
Orthodox Church.
51
 Kazan had Tatar language schools in the time of Catherine II.
52
 In 
this way the foundations were laid for contemporary Tatar autonomy. 
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It was evident in the late tsarist period that the Empire must pay institutional and 
constitutional regard to its ethnic and linguistic complexity, outlined in part in the 
preceding section, or face the possibility of disintegration. The responses to these issues 
were surprisingly contemporary in their language and tone. Leading Russian scholars 
argued at length as to the nature of autonomy in the Russian Empire. In 1892 N. M. 
Korkunov discussed the various forms of autonomy, preserving local laws and 
institutions, to a greater or lesser extent.
53
 V. V. Sokolovskiy also sought to prove that the 
existence of autonomy did not contradict the integrity of the Russian Empire.
54
 
A significant number of publications followed the first Russian Revolution of 
1905, which almost brought an end to the Empire. This was a time for serious re-thinking 
of the Empire’s foundations. F. F. Kokoshkin argued in a book published in 1905 that 
regional autonomy did not mean the creation of a state within a state.
55
 For Kokoshkin, if 
there were to be local laws, as existed in Russia, there must be local legislatures. The 
State Duma could legislate for all-Russian matters, and local legislatures on the local 
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scale.
56
 The Empire must retain its legislative supremacy.
57
 According to him, regional 
autonomy was the highest stage of the development of decentralization. In a further 
publication in 1908 he distinguished between autonomous krai and autonomous oblast.
58
 
Kokoshkin returned to this question in 1917, and emphasized its close connection with 
the national (ethnic) question.
59
 He argued that decentralization to a greater or lesser 
extent was a powerful means for satisfying the demands of ethnic groups to self-
determination, especially cultural self-determination, and that this could take the form of 
territorial decentralization, but also other forms. He made the case that in the Russian 
Empire it would be impossible to build a federation on the basis of national territorial 
autonomy. For example, Ukraine with a population of 25–30 million, more than Spain, 
would far outweigh other regions of Russia. To give unequal competences to the 
component parts of Russia would also lead to a blind alley, he thought;
60
 or rather than a 
federation, to confederation. 
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In 1906 a collection Autonomy, Federation and the National (Ethnic) Question 
appeared, edited by V. M. Gessen, arguing that national autonomy should precede the 
establishment of a parliamentary, rule of law, state.
61
 Autonomy or other forms of 
political independence were the best way of resolving ethnic tensions. The authors 
pointed out that notwithstanding the centralized political government of Russia, it 
preserved within itself a series of local laws.
62
 Thus, in the Privislenskiy Krai (in Poland) 
the Code Civil of Napoleon I had been in force since 1808, while in the Ostzeiskii Krai 
(in the Baltic) a whole range of laws including Roman law were in force. In Finland the 
Swedish laws of 1734 were in operation. Because of its Byzantine past Bessarabiya had 
laws with Byzantine roots. In the Governorates of Chernigov and Poltava the Lithuanian 
statutes remained in force. In the Caucasus and many other places, special, particular 
laws were applied. Whole regions of the Russian Empire lived and had lived their own 
juridical life. In another chapter of the work, the question of the unity of the state was 
also addressed by E. Pimenova, who argued that regional autonomy could be an efficient 
way of resolving the national (ethnic) problem in Russia.
63
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In another key text published in 1906, G. Novotorzhskiy argued that the 
contemporary Russian state had come into being through conquest, and therefore 
consisted of a whole range of regions, formed on a national as well as administrative 
basis.
64
 In Russia these were Finland, Poland, Ukraine, Caucasus, the Pribaltiskiy Krai, 
Lithuania, Siberia, and finally ‘Great Russia’. He wrote: 
Finland at the present time has almost complete autonomy. The question 
of Polish autonomy demands resolution in the shortest possible time, as 
soon as the police state is abolished. The question of autonomy for the 
Caucasus is more complex, since many ethnicities are living there, mixed 
with each other. The Jewish question can be resolved by giving the Jews 
the full rights enjoyed by other ethnicities in Russia, and by guaranteeing 
the rights of the minorities which they will constitute in Poland, Ukraine, 
Great Russia and Byelorussia. As concerns the autonomies of Ukraine, 
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Siberia autonomous regions in Great Russia, they can be created as 
required. As, so to say, autonomies of the second rank.
65
 
This passage has a distinctly contemporary ring. 
Other works of the same nature included A. T. Snarskiy’s 1907 Autonomy or 
Federation?, and the survey published in 1907 by the Pole K. Kulchitskiy (Mazovetskiy) 
Autonomy and Federation in Contemporary Constitutional States.
66
 
Non-territorial autonomy was also intensively debated in this period. Kulchitskiy 
was one of a number of Russian authors who reflected on ‘cultural-national autonomy’. 
In 1917, M. Y. Lazerson wrote a book entitled Autonomy and Federation which argued 
forcefully for ‘personal autonomy’—that is, non-territorial autonomy—drawing on Karl 
Renner’s writings.67 In his view, one should not, in a contemporary state, consider the 
population as tied to particular territories. Such a state, with many ethnicities, cannot be 
divided into territories in each of which there is a single ethnicity.
68
 However, he argued 
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strongly against the term ‘national-cultural autonomy’, which in his view confused the 
territorial principles and the personal principle.
69
 
6.4 Lenin and Bolshevik Concepts of Territorial Autonomy 
Kutafin makes the point that the Bolsheviks, as convinced centralists, approached the 
idea of national (ethnic) autonomy very cautiously.
70
 I have investigated in detail the way 
in which Lenin developed his position on the right of nations to self-determination in 
fierce argument with those such as the Jewish Bund who espoused non-territorial 
personal cultural autonomy on the Austro-Marxist model.
71
 His understanding of self-
determination followed the positions taken and language used by Marx and Engels in 
relation to Ireland and Britain, and Poland and Russia. For them and for Lenin there were 
indeed Irish and Polish nations with a right to statehood. The concept of ‘nation’ did not 
require further explanation or analysis. 
In October 1913 Lenin, having stated that ‘The right of nations to self-
determination, i.e., the right to secede and form independent national states, will be dealt 
with elsewhere’ declared himself in favour of local autonomy:72 
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Obviously, one cannot conceive of a modern, truly democratic state that 
did not grant such autonomy to every region having any appreciably 
distinct economic and social features, populations of a specific national 
composition, etc. The principle of centralism, which is essential for the 
development of capitalism, is not violated by this (local and regional) 





Why national areas with populations, not only of half a million, but even 
of 50,000, should not be able to enjoy autonomy; why such areas should 
not be able to unite in the most diverse ways with neighbouring areas of 
different dimensions into a single autonomous ‘territory’ if that is 
convenient or necessary for economic intercourse—these things remain 
the secret of the Bundist Medem.
74
 
This was Lenin’s argument for territorial autonomy and against non-territorial autonomy. 
Lenin returned to this question in 1916, in the midst of World War I and before 
the October Revolution, summing up issues of self-determination, when he wrote that it 
was autonomy which could enable a nation, hitherto forcibly retained within an existing 
state (such as the Russian Empire) to ‘crystallise into a nation’. He had in mind Norway’s 
declaration of sovereignty from Denmark in 1814, and envisaged a declaration by the 
Polish nation that they would no longer be ruled by the Russian Tsar. He wrote: 
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But as everyone knows, in practice a reform is often merely a step towards 
revolution. It is autonomy that enables a nation forcibly retained within the 
boundaries of a given state to crystallise into a nation, to gather, assess and 
organise its forces, and to select the most opportune moment for a 
declaration . . . in the ‘Norwegian’ spirit: We, the autonomous diet of 
such-and-such a nation, or of such-and-such a territory, declare that the 
Emperor of all the Russias has ceased to be King of Poland, etc.
75
 
Thus it is clear that before the October Revolution Lenin was in favour of the idea of 
creating broad regional autonomies in Russia. 
In May 1917 the issue of independence for Poland and Finland was again at the 
top of the agenda, and Lenin drafted a Resolution on the National Question. His starting 
point was clear, namely recognition of the right of all nations forming part of Russia 
freely to secede and form independent states. To deny them such a right, or to fail as a 
Russian government to take the necessary measures to guarantee the realization of the 




From secession from the Russian Empire Lenin turned to the issue of autonomy. 
He meant territorial autonomy: he opposed the non-territorial ‘national cultural 
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autonomy’ formulated by the Austro-Marxists Otto Bauer and Karl Renner, and espoused 
by the Jewish Bund. He made it clear that autonomy meant support for broad regional 
autonomy. Moreover, he advocated the abolition of supervision from above, and the 
abolition of a compulsory official language, both of which were features of the 
assimilationist policies of the late tsarist regime. Above all, the local population itself 
must decide on fixing the boundaries of the autonomous territory.
77
 
In 1916, Lenin wrote in relation to Poland: 
All those who want to stand for the freedom of nations, for the right of 
nations to self-determination, not hypocritically, not in the Südekum, 
Plekhanov, Kautsky fashion, but sincerely, must be opposed to the war 
because of the oppression of Poland; they must be in favour of the right of 
secession from Russia for those nations which Russia is now, oppressing: 
the Ukraine, Finland, etc.
78
 
Thus, before the October Revolution Lenin was in favour not only of a right of secession 
from Russia by nations, but also of territorial autonomy for minorities. 
These policies were key components of Bolshevik policy from the moment of 
Bolshevik success in October 1917. In ‘The Tasks of the Revolution’, published in 
October 1917, Lenin declared that a democratic peace would be impossible without an 
explicit renunciation of annexation or seizure. He emphasized that every nationality 
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without exception in Europe and in the colonies should have the right to decide for itself 
whether it should form a separate state.
79
 
This right was enshrined in the 1918 Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federated 
Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Every people should decide whether they wished to 
participate in the RSFSR and on what basis. This was the only basis for creating a free 
and voluntary state. In this spirit the 1918 Constitution of the RSFSR
80
 provided in 
Article 1, Chapter 4: 
8. In its effort to create a league—free and voluntary, and for that reason 
all the more complete and secure—of the working classes of all the 
peoples of Russia, the Third Congress of Soviets merely establishes the 
fundamental principles of the Federation of Russian Soviet Republics, 
leaving to the workers and peasants of every people to decide the 
following question at their plenary sessions of their soviets, namely, 
whether or not they desire to participate, and on what basis, in the Federal 
government and other Federal soviet institutions. 
And in Article 2, Chapter 5 
11. The soviets of those regions which differentiate themselves by a 
special form of existence and national character may unite in autonomous 
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regional unions, ruled by the local congress of the soviets and their 
executive organs. 
These autonomous regional unions participate in the Russian Socialist 
Federated Soviet Republic upon a Federal basis.
81
 
On this basis, the Labouring Commune of Germans of the Volga was organized at the 
end of 1918, and in 1924 became an autonomous republic. The Bashkir ASSR was 
established within the RSFSR in 1919, followed in 1920–1 by the Kirgiz (Kazakh) 
ASSR, and the Tatar, Dagestan, and Gorkiy autonomous republics, the Karelian 
Labouring Commune, and the Chuvash, Kalmyk, Marii, Votskaya (Udmurtskaya) 
autonomous oblasts (regions). In 1921–2 the Yakutsk ASSR, and the Karachaev-




In early 1918, as the civil war raged, Lenin explained why in his view centralism 
was not incompatible with autonomy and federation: 
We are for democratic centralism. And it must be clearly understood how 
vastly different democratic centralism is from bureaucratic centralism on 
the one hand and from anarchism on the other. The opponents of 
centralism continually put forward autonomy and federation as a means of 
struggle against the uncertainties of centralism. As a matter of fact, 
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democratic centralism in no way excludes autonomy, on the contrary, it 
presupposes the necessity of it . . . The example of the Russian Soviet 
Republic shows us particularly clearly that federation, which we are 
introducing and will introduce, is now the surest step towards the most 




Outside Russia, the principle of self-determination was put into practice. Independent 
states on the Baltic territories appeared in 1920, with the Treaty of Tartu in February of 
1920 which accepted Estonian independence; the Treaty of Moscow in July of 1920 
which accepted Lithuanian independence; and the Treaty of Riga in August of 1920, 
which accepted Latvian independence. In November 1920 Lenin declared: 
Of the small states formerly belonging to the Russian Empire, Poland has 
been among those that have been most of all at odds with the Great-
Russian nation during the last three years, and made the greatest claims to 
a large slice of territory inhabited by non-Poles. We concluded peace with 
Finland, Estonia and Latvia also against the wishes of the imperialist 
Entente, but this was easier because the bourgeoisie of Finland, Estonia 
and Latvia entertained no imperialist aims that would call for a war against 
the Soviet Republic, whereas the Polish bourgeois republic had an eye, not 
only to Lithuania and Byelorussia but the Ukraine as well. 
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Latvian ruling circles were also compelled to sign peace with the RSFSR, 
following the defeat of the foreign interventionists and the whiteguards in 
1919 and the resulting consolidation of Soviet Russia’s international 
position. On March 25, 1920, the Latvian Foreign Ministry approached the 
Soviet Government suggesting that peace talks be started. On April 16, the 
Soviet and Latvian representatives started peace talks in Moscow and on 
August 11 a treaty was signed with Latvia in Riga.
84
 
I contend that the appearance, for the first time in history, of three independent states in 
the Baltic region was the consequence of the implementation of political principle, and 
not an opportunistic response to military defeat. 
I also argue that Lenin, unlike Stalin, had no intention of extending the boundaries 
of Soviet Russia to include the former possessions of the tsarist Empire. His principled 
position did not change at the end of his life. In his letter of 26 September 1922, at the 
time of increasing conflict with Stalin as to the right of Georgia to gain independence 
outside the USSR—to secede—Lenin wrote: 
we consider ourselves, the Ukrainian S.S.R. and others, equal, and enter 
with them, on an equal basis, into a new union, a new federation, the 
Union of the Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia.
85
 
                                                          
84
 V. I. Lenin, ‘Our Foreign and Domestic Position and Party Tasks’ Speech Delivered 
To The Moscow Gubernia Conference Of The R.C.P.(B.)’, accessed 11 November 2014, 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/nov/21.htm. 
85
 V. I. Lenin, ‘On the Establishment of the U.S.S.R.’, accessed 28 March 2011, 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1922/sep/26.htm. 
In his Last Testament, written in 1922–3, Lenin wrote, warning against Stalin: 
It is quite natural that in such circumstances the ‘freedom to secede from 
the union’ by which we justify ourselves will be a mere scrap of paper, 
unable to defend the non-Russians from the onslaught of that really 
Russian man, the Great-Russian chauvinist, in substance a rascal and a 
tyrant, such as the typical Russian bureaucrat is.
86
 
Lenin by then regarded Stalin as just such a Great-Russian chauvinist. 
Lenin died on 21 January 1924. The 1924 Constitution of the USSR
87
 of 31 
January 1924, which incorporated the Treaty of December 1922 creating the USSR, 
contained the following, fully consistent with the principles on which Lenin insisted: 
Chapter II Sovereign Rights of the Member Republics 
Article 3. 
The sovereignty of the member Republics is limited only in the matters 
indicated in the present Constitution, as coming within the competence of 
the Union. Outside of those limits, each member Republic exerts its public 
powers independently; the USSR protects the rights of the member 
Republics. 
Article 4. 
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Each one of the member Republics retains the right to freely withdraw 
from the Union. 
Article 5. 
The member Republics will make changes in their Constitutions to 
conform with the present Constitution. 
Article 6. 
The territory of the member Republics cannot be modified without their 
consent; also, any limitation or modification or suppression of Article 4 
must have the approval of all the member Republics of the Union. 
Article 7. 
Just one federal nationality is established for the citizens of the member 
Republics. 
The remaining history of the USSR was marked by a strong tension between regional and 
ethnic autonomy on the one hand and the dictatorship of the Party and its General 
Secretary on the other. 
This leads me to my (friendly) criticism of Terry Martin. In his book of that title, 
Martin starts with the question ‘Why did the Bolsheviks adopt this radical strategy?’.88 
He asserts first of all that ‘When they seized power in October 1917, they did not yet 
possess a coherent nationalities policy.’89 As we have seen above, that is not quite right. 
He acknowledges that the Bolsheviks had a ‘powerful slogan’ but states that this slogan 
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was shared with Woodrow Wilson: to me, this is a surprising proposition. It seems that 
Martin is not sufficiently aware of the passionate debates of the pre-war years on the 




According to Martin, the content of Soviet nationalities policy was ‘finally 
delineated’ at the Twelfth Party Congress in April 1923, and at a special Central 
Committee conference on nationalities policy in June 1923.
91
 That is, in the very last 
months of Lenin’s life, and after his conflict with Stalin over independence for Georgia. 
Martin, therefore, cannot explain how, well before April 1923, most of the 
territorial autonomies which have continued in existence until the present day had already 
been created. 
Nor does Martin have anything to say about the rich history of autonomy in the 
tsarist Empire, which I have explored above.
92
 The obvious point is this: Soviet 
nationalities policy did not come from nothing. It had deep roots not only in Bolshevik 
ideology, but also in tsarist history.
93
 
However, Martin does provide a series of case studies showing in detail how the 
Bolsheviks responded to the rising tide of nationalism ‘by systematically promoting the 
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national consciousness of its ethnic minorities and establishing for many of them the 
characteristic institutional forms of the nation-state.’94 Thus, he notes that: 
The Tatar national movement was among the strongest in the Soviet 
Union, and certainly the strongest in the Soviet era. The Tatar nationalist 
elite lobbied aggressively for and vigorously supported to Soviet policy of 
korenizatsiya: the formation of a Tatar republic, the promotion of Tatars 
into leadership positions, the use of the Tatar language in government and 
education, and support for Tatar national culture. However, this movement 
also faced formidable resistance. Tatars formed a narrow plurality in their 
own republic (48.7% Tatar and 43.1% Russian).’95 
Martin had not seen Schamiloglu’s work, apparently, since this showed that the roots of 
Tatar self-consciousness extended back into the tsarist period. 
6.5 A Retreat from National-Cultural Autonomy—or ‘Autonomy’ 
as an Empty Shell? 
I have already referred, above, to Russia’s accession to the CoE’s FCNM, and the 
emphasis given in its first Report of 2000 to its experiment in NCA. On 9 April 2010 
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Russia published its Third Periodic Report to the Advisory Committee (AC) on the 
FCNM.
96
 In particular, a new development in NCA was highlighted. Russia asserted that 
the end of 2005 saw some changes introduced to the Federal Law ‘On 
National and Cultural Autonomy’ concerning determining of the federal 
executive body under which a consultative council on national and cultural 
autonomies was to be created. In execution of this law, the Government of 
the Russian Federation adopted a resolution no. 527-R of 17 April 2006 
assigning the role of the above executive body to the Ministry of regional 
development of the Russian Federation.
97
 
Further in the Report, Russia continued:
98
 
Among specialized bodies ensuring interaction between national public 
associations and governmental authorities on the federal level, we can 
name the Consultative Council on National and Cultural Autonomies 
Affairs under the Ministry of Regional Development of the Russian 
Federation. Federal Law No 146-FZ of 30 November 2005 introduced 
changes to Article 7 of the Federal Law ‘On national and cultural 
autonomy’ that authorized the Government of the Russian Federation to 
determine the executive body under which a consultative council on 
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national and cultural autonomies affairs, acting on a voluntary basis, is to 
be created. 
. . . The Council comprised leaders of all federal national and cultural 
autonomies. The first session of the Consultative Council on National and 
Cultural Autonomies Affairs took place on 15 June 2006. 
Sessions of the Consultative Council are held twice a year. 
This rather positive message was sharply contradicted on 25 July 2012 by the FCNM’s 
AC, in its Opinion. The AC had taken the opportunity to visit Russia from 12 to 16 




They turned to the topic of NCAs,
100
 and reminded their readers
101
 that in the first 
two cycles: 
In the previous monitoring cycles, the Advisory Committee encouraged 
the authorities to restore, in collaboration with stakeholders, the central 
position of national cultural autonomies in federal legislation and to take 
measures to ensure the effective implementation of the competences of 
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Russia was in this way put on the spot with regards to its NCA policy. The amending 
NCA Law of 2009 had enabled regional and local authorities to make payments to NCAs, 
but without imposing an obligation; and the new law imposed no requirement to 
consult.
103
 Practice therefore varied widely from region to region. The AC continued that 
taking account of the great importance given to NCAs by state nationalities policy, in fact 
NCAs were restricted to ‘manifestations folkloriques’ and Sunday schools, thus 
discouraging minority communities from taking part in the much more extensive debates 
as to the future of Russian society, and preventing their effective participation in public 
life in general.
104
 These concerns were reinforced
105
 when the AC turned to Article 7 of 
the FCNM.
106
They expressed particular concern over the dissolution of the Ukrainian 
NCA in 2011, pursuant to an order made by the Ministry of Justice and confirmed by the 
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minority to freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of 
expression, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion.’ 
Supreme Court.
107
 The Ukrainian NCA was said to have exceeded its competence by 
engaging in politics, but for the AC this was an unfortunate consequence of limiting 
NCAs to cultural matters. To this they added their disagreement with the federal 
legislation which forbids the formation of political parties on ethnic or religious grounds. 
The AC criticized the Consultative Council, of which the Russian Report had 
made so much.
108
 It regretted that by virtue of the rules governing the creation of NCAs, 
the Council’s mandate was limited to questions of the preservation and promotion of the 
cultures of minorities. It could say little about the financing of NCAs. 
For the AC, it was clear that the numbers of NCAs continued to grow largely as a 
result of the desire of the individuals creating them to attract possible finance and to gain 
status. 
6.6 Recent Developments—The Decay of NCAs? 
There have been significant changes in Russia in recent years. On 19 December 2012 
President Putin signed Decree No. 1666 confirming the new ‘Strategy of State National 
Policy for the Period to 2025’ (the Strategy).109 By ‘national’ is meant ‘ethnic’, and the 
two words are used interchangeably in Russian. The Strategy replaced the ‘Concept of 
State National Policy’ confirmed by President Yeltsin’s Decree No. 909 of 15 June 1999. 
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On 20 August 2013, by Order No.718, the Russian government confirmed the Federal 
Strategic Programme ‘Strengthening the unity of the Rossiiskiy (civic Russian) nation 
and the ethnocultural development of the peoples of Russia (2014–2020)’, intended to 
implement the Strategy.
110
 The latter document makes no mention of NCA, apart from a 
reference to the 1996 Law. 
Further insight into government strategy was given by President Putin’s 
introductory remarks to the meeting of the Presidential Council on Inter-ethnic relations 
on 19 February 2013. He insisted that the main task of nationality policy must be to 
‘strengthen harmony and accord’ among Russian citizens, so that they will see 
themselves as ‘citizens of a single country’.111 He outlined five key concepts of the new 
policy. First, he declared that the Russian language is ‘the fundamental basis of the unity 
of the country’. Second, he called for the preparation of a single standard national history 
textbook. Third, he said that he supports the work of the 989 NCAs. Fourth, he opposed 
the return of cultural monuments confiscated by the Soviets to their original owners. 
Finally, he emphasized the importance of major sports events such as the Winter 
Olympics at Sochi in helping to fuse the many peoples of the Russian Federation into 
one. 
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The then Minister of Regional Development, Igor Slunyayev, responded to 
President Putin. First, he gestured to the Plan for Implementation of the Strategy drawn 
up by his Ministry and signed by Prime Minister Medvedev on 1 March 2013.
112
 He 
promised reports on progress twice a year. Only a few minutes later he was to concede 
that practically nothing had been done. 
Next he turned to statistics which showed that in 2013 there were 224,000 non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) active in the Russian Federation, but only 15 NCAs 
at the federal level, 245 at the regional level, and 639 at the local level. He continued that 
‘the activities of some NCAs, unfortunately, at times remind one of elements of family 
business.’ 
In addition, he said, it was important not to miss the practical results of the 
activities of NCAs, and in this connection he announced that he planned to ‘actualize’ the 
work of the Consultative Council mentioned above. To be honest, he continued, the 
Council practically did not work. In 2011–12 it met only three times, and, unfortunately 
neither representatives of federal organs nor representatives of NCAs took part. 
Mr Slunyayev had been in office for only 18 months, but this was a dismal 
account of inactivity since the Consultative Councils were created in 2006. The 
misgivings of the FCNM’s Advisory Committee seemed to be entirely borne out. 
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For one commentator, Vladimir Dergachev, writing in Izvestiya, it was plain that 
Mr Putin was proposing to make the inhabitants of Russia into one nation.
113
 But for the 
veteran historian Aleksandr Yanov, writing in Novaya Gazeta, Putin had not yet learned 
to ‘distinguish patriotism from nationalism’, and was seeking to replace the classic tsarist 
trinity of Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality (Narodnost) proposed by Count Uvarov 
in 1833 and taken up by Nikolai I in the deep reaction which followed the Napoleonic 
Wars, with Patriotism, Sovereignty, and Tradition. Putin is a nationalist ‘of the purest 
water’, and his new trinity will fall apart in front of our eyes.114 
Putin’s five concepts and his ‘triad’ are anathema to the leaders of Russia’s ethnic 
and linguistic minorities, and their entrenched territorial autonomies. Ironically, and Putin 
does not understand this, the continued attraction of NCAs is based in large measure on 
their connection with the idea of autonomy, so deeply rooted in Russia. 
On 8 September 2014 the Ministry of Regional Development, founded just ten 
years earlier on 13 September 2004, was dissolved by decree of President Putin, and its 
functions distributed between the Economic Development Ministry, the Ministry of 
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Construction, Housing and Utilities, and the Culture Ministry.
115
 The Ministry of Culture 
would be responsible for the protection of the rights of national minorities and indigenous 
peoples, and would guarantee state support for the ethno-cultural development of 
peoples. The Ministry of Justice would have powers in the sphere of the territorial 
structure of the Russian Federation, and would also look into questions of the division of 




The news was broken to Mr Slunyayev half an hour before he was due to start a 
meeting in St Petersburg of a presidium of his Ministry colleagues.
117
 According to Prime 
Minister Dmitry Medvedev, reported on 11 September, the recent establishment of 
specialized ministries for the Crimea, the Far East, and the North Caucasus had made the 
Regional Development Ministry superfluous.
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 ‘Moscow Kicks Regional Development Out of Ministry’, Barentsobserver, accessed 
11 November 2014, http://barentsobserver.com/en/politics/2014/09/moscow-kicks-
6.7 Conclusion 
It should be no surprise at all that the word ‘autonomy’ resonates so strongly in 
contemporary Russia. I have shown that this was no Soviet trick or show, but that 
territorial and indeed the concepts of non-territorial autonomy have deep roots in Russia 
and its history. 
However, the Russian experiment in non-territorial autonomy, the NCAs, was 
evidently the topic of severe misgivings by no less than the (now deposed) Minister 
responsible for implementation of the state policy towards minorities. 
And the attention of the federal government has turned elsewhere. In the May-
June 2014 issue of the Pro et Contra, Alexander Verkhovskiy wrote a rather pessimistic 
article under the title ‘The ethnopolitics of the federal authorities and the activisation of 
Russian nationalism.’119 His article is summed up: ‘The federal authorities place before 
                                                                                                                                                                             
regional-development-out-ministry-11-09. ‘Russian government management of High 
North developments, indigenous peoples and cross-border cooperation faces a reshuffle 
as President Putin abolishes the Ministry of Regional development.’ 
119
 Verkhovskiy founded that authoritative SOVA Centre: ‘SOVA Center for Information 
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2002. SOVA Center conducts research and informational work on nationalism and 
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are also interested in human rights issues, especially government misuse of counter-
extremism measures.’ See SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, accessed 2 June 
2014, http://www.sova-center.ru/en/; Council under the President of the Russian 
Federation the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights, accessed 2 June 2014, 
themselves a fully meaningful task in the sphere of ethnopolitics, but do not make any 
efforts which even theoretically could be sufficient for achieving a result.’ 
His article does not once mention non-territorial autonomy, or its Russian variant, 
national-cultural autonomy. The key issue is now Putin’s new-found nationalism, 
encapsulated in his conservative ‘triad’. This will come into sharp conflict with both 
territorial and non-territorial autonomy. 
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